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Strengthening institutions to legitimise business continuity in weak institutional environments 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how weak institutional environments influence MNE decision making to be 
involved in creating public good facilities with the aim of reducing community risk, and to what 
extend these can be traced back to the MNE choose of a Head Quarter (HQ) or local embeddedness 
driven strategies. Institutions are important in relation to risk management as they reduce 
uncertainty about transactions costs. From norms, which guide the interaction and dealing between 
individuals, to societies legal systems where disputes can be settled by an objective court. However, 
in regions where formal institutions are either weak, by that unable to enforce its own rules, MNEs 
can encounter severe difficulties as they lack knowledge, especially about informal institutions, that 
determine ‘the rules of the game’ in the business environment. MNEs can apply two distinct generic 
risk management strategies in their dealings with local communities. One strategy is based on rules 
provide by the HQ, which focuses on providing guidelines in compliance with normative global 
institutions, while another strategy focuses on embedding the subsidiary in the local institutional 
environment. Both of these strategies aim at reducing or mitigating community risk by engaging in 
renovating institutions or by constructing them in local communities were the MNE is active. Three 
distinct categories of local institution building were investigated related to Education, Infrastructure 
as well as cultural or social institutions. The findings show that by prescribing to either an 
Embeddedness or HQ driven strategy the MNEs either gained or lost legitimacy with the local 
communities. Companies that gained legitimacy were following an Embeddedness strategy and that 
investments in institution building were made in close corporation with local community. Findings 
also show that local dependence on these intuitions grew stronger and community members became 
increasingly reliant on the benefits that came with these continuous investments. The alternative 
HQ driven strategy findings showed that these companies lost local legitimacy and thereby 
increased the community risk they were exposed to. These companies did not invest especially in 
institution building and the ones that did focus on more general types of activities such as 
sponsorships or scholarships that were targeting a much wider stakeholder audience. It was found 
that engagement in institution building, not only had a direct operational impact, as in the case of 
infrastructure (gaining access to quality road, electricity, etc.) and educational (access to qualified 
labour, research, etc.), but also served a purpose as part of a risk mitigation strategy towards NGOs 
and the media. By gaining legitimacy and dependence from local communities the MNE reduced 
the risk that the community would contact and engage with these outside and possible powerful 
stakeholders. Institution building hence serves a dual purpose, firstly, making communities reliant 
on the MNE by providing public good facilities in the absence or at best weak institutional 
environment. Secondly, serving as an effective risk mitigation tool that keeps aggressive actors 
from partnering with local communities against the company thereby presenting a risk to its 
continued operations. 
 
1.0 Introduction  
This paper explores how mining multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Armenia are responding to 
operating in weak institutional environment by building or strengthening public good institutions in 
local communities, with the aim of reducing risk originating from local communities. Institutional 
theory is often used in order to study and understand how organisations adopt, defuse and change 
based on pressure from their internal and external environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powel, 1983, Scott, 1995). Conventional thinking, within the International Business 
literature, suggests that MNEs are displaying a reactive behaviour to changes in their institutional 
environment in order to retain or remain legitimate in the eyes of salient stakeholders (DiMaggio 
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and Powel, 1983; Ghoshal and Westney, 2004:47; Peng et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 2009; Boddewyn 
and Doh, 2011). This follows the rationale that institutions moderate corporate behaviour and 
mitigate effects that deemed undesirable by society. Organisations that are catering to institutional 
pressure are regarded as legitimate and can uphold their ‘license to operate’ (Prno and Slombe, 
2014). This process is part of the raison d’etre in societies where the institutional environment is 
well developed and functioning and where there is a high degree of transparency related to the 
society and business relationship (Campbell, 2007; De Geer et al., 2009). In developing or 
emerging markets, where the institutional pressure can be arbitrary or lacking, there can be 
significant differences to what degree organisations are adapting to these pressures to conform 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2010:84). This can be in cases where there is a poorly functioning judiciary 
system, arbitrary enforcement of rules, a lack of best practice or that government agencies promote 
certain norms, which are contradicting or is incompatible with international standards (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2000). While some organisations would look at this type of business 
environment as a blessing, it presents real challenges for MNEs that span multiple locations with 
varying levels of institutional efficiency and thereby pressure to conform (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; Orr and Scott, 2008). For the MNE an unstructured business environment presents an uneven 
‘playing field’ and increased uncertainty about the ‘rules of the game’ and thereby a potential 
increase in transaction cost (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Peng, 2003). 
Through history there have been plenty examples where MNEs have behaved poorly and violated 
not only national but also international norms for good governance because the institutional 
environment made this kind of behaviour possible (Kirsch, 2014). This is true not only in mining, 
which is researched in this paper, but also for many other companies like Nike sweatshops in 
Vietnam or Apple phone assembling at Foxconn in China, just to name a few popular examples 
(DeTinne and Lewis, 2005; Guo et al., 2012). The significant media attention these cases receive 
highlight the need for MNEs to think differently about the local institutional environment and the 
practices that they implement when operating in foreign markets. However, little attention has been 
given by international business research, to MNEs that are active in constructing and supporting 
facilities in their local environment that under normal institutional settings would fall within the 
state. And how these institutional activities are affecting risk mitigation efficiency when it comes to 
handling uncertainty that could affect business continuity, with its roots in issues related to the 
weak institutional environment.  
 
Using fieldwork data collected from MNEs operating in the Armenian mining sector, where MNEs 
operate in a weak institutional environment, it is sought to understand how institution building 
influence risk mitigation by answering the research question- How does a weak institutional 
environment influence MNE decision making to be involved in creating public good facilities in 
order to reduce community risk, and to what extent can these be traced back to the MNE to the 
choice of a Head Quarter or Local Embeddedness driven strategy? 
 
2.0 Theory 
2.1 Dealing with the institutional environment 
Institutions constitute the ‘rules of the game’ in society or the constraints that shape the behaviour 
of both humans and other institutions (North, 1991:4). Organisations adopt the norms and rule of 
their environment in order to be regarded as legitimate and thereby becoming a reflection of social 
practise (Meyer and Rowan, 1977:343). They seek to adapt to their institutional environment 
because they gain legitimacy and thereby makes it easier for them to engage with their salient 
stakeholders. In advanced economies the relationship between business and society might reflect 
these legitimacy demands but in an emerging or developing market these institutions can either be 
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weak or lacking (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Burki, 2012; Puffer et al., 
2016). For MNEs that spans multiple institutional environments the need to adapt to sometime 
contradictory legitimacy demands, creates significant governance and managerial uncertainties that 
need to be overcome. This has laid the ground for research into how MNEs can act socially 
responsible in their interaction with their stakeholders, not only in their home country but across 
multiple locations (Campbell et al., 2012; Ionnou and Serafeim, 2012). However, in order to be 
regarded as socially responsible by a wider stakeholder constituency it requires a strong and well-
enforced institutional environment or that the MNE have institutionalised its governance in such a 
way that it can be regarded as legitimate across locations regardless of the local institutions in place 
(Campbell, 2007).         
 
MNEs have explored two different community risk strategies when engaging in these weak 
institutional environments. Firstly, they can chose to give a high degree of autonomy to its 
subsidiaries and thereby embed itself in the local institutional context becoming similar to local 
firms operating in the market (Campbell et al., 2012; Surroca et al. 2013). Hereby it is possible for 
the Head Quarter (HQ) to distance itself from the legitimacy demands in the home country by 
transferring decision making power to the geographical more distant local management. A second 
option is for the MNE to adopt a strategy whereby the subsidiary adopts best practices and norms 
that prevails through the industry but keeps central control of important decisions (Feinberg and 
Gupta, 2009). Both strategies represent institutional pulls that aim at ensuring the organisation to be 
regarded as legitimate by salient stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). While the two 
perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as a strategy can be to utilize standards for 
corporate decision making and behaviour that aims at embedding subsidiaries in the local context. 
However, there will be differences in the performance of these two approaches as an HQ driven 
strategy will cater to a much larger contingency, which will be reflected in the types of activities 
that the MNE in the end will engage in. While an embeddedness strategy to a larger extent will 
cater to local and immediate needs of the local community.  
 
This convergence or isomorphic pull on the MNE towards a given practice, can take three different 
forms. Firstly, there can be coercive, but often arbitrary pressure to changes in behaviour that in 
some way will influence transaction-specific investments that the MNE is engaged in. For example 
through adaption to local legislation, that might not conform with international norms, when 
pursing a subsidiary focused strategy or by “overbidding” local laws through the implementation of 
higher corporate standards than required. Secondly, mimetic isomorphism is witnessed when the 
MNE imitate others organisations behaviour based on an evaluation of how successful they are at 
certain activities, or use of certain technologies that are believed to give other organisations a 
competitive advantage. However, a weak institutional environment such mimicking behaviour often 
presents the organisation with ethical and moral dilemmas when confronted with, for example, 
corrupt behaviour or none-transparent practices. Thirdly, normative pressure prevails from the need 
for the MNE to be regarded as legitimate. It can stem from strong supplier relationships that favours 
certain systematic approaches where streamlining governance systems makes sense for the sake of 
efficiency or a lack of alternative technologies making one approach prevailing.  
 
Operating in multiple institutional environments presents a challenge to MNEs strategic decision 
making, as it navigates between different locations where there can are considerable differences in 
institutional pressure. In a strong institutional environment, which is typically found in the home 
country, there can be strong isomorphic pulls for the MNE to behave in accordance with 
international norms and rules while in the weak institutional environment these isomorphic pulls 
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will be less salient. This could engender the MNE to take advantage of the apparent opportunities 
that such an environment presents but also means that it risks losing legitimacy in other locations 
where it is active. This prompts some MNEs that operates in weak institutional to engage in not 
only social responsible behaviour or “overbidding” legislation but also engagement in creating or 
strengthening local public good facilities, which could help strengthen the institutional environment 
and thereby risk of losing local legitimacy and be subjected to community risk.  
 
2.2. Community risk 
The term ‘risk’ has many different connotations and there is no universally adopted definition of 
how the concept should be understood (Lupton, 1999). In an institutional and International business 
context, risk refers to how MNE managers react and subsequent takes decision in an uncertain 
business environment, as well as the lack of certainty in the outcome that these decisions will create 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1998; Hagigi and Sivakumar, 2009; Figueira et al., 2011). This paper adopts 
the term as a reference to the unpredictability in corporate outcome variables and the uncertainty 
connected with managerial decision making (Miller, 1992). When related to community risk it is 
conceptualized as the relative chance that MNE activities are prompting local communities to 
regard it as illegitimate and prompting an response by the community that makes it impossible to 
continue operation. For the risk decision maker the task is to understand and formulate strategies 
that mitigate community risk by ensuring that the MNE can remain legitimate and by engaging with 
institutions that are perceived as legitimate by the community, thereby ensuring that the short- and 
long-term objectives of the firm can be reached.          
 
2.3 Operating in a weak institutional environment 
Emerging markets in general and local communities especially are very diverse and it would be 
hard to pinpoint one set of uniform institutional shortcomings (Meyer et al., 2009; Rottig, 2016). 
However, there are certain characteristic, which is salient in most of these local contexts and 
thereby constitutes the boundaries of what can be considered a weak institutional environment. 
Firstly, there are issues related to infrastructure like access to good roads, constant supply of 
electricity and gas or even telephone coverage (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). The lack of or poorly 
maintained infrastructure can have a direct influence on the ability of the MNE to operate and in a 
given context and create a need for additional investments, which are not directly related to the 
project, thereby increasing transaction costs (Meyer, 2001). Secondly, access to qualified labour can 
be another issue that the MNE need to address. The education system and therefor the graduates 
that the MNE is looking for, might not be of an academic standard, in order to produce at the 
required quality. In some contexts the local government will forces MNEs to take on local 
employees in order to build labour capacity but if the quality is not at the required standard, it could 
mean increased costs that must be endured by the company. Thirdly, companies can be required to 
address local cultural and social issues, which are deeply engrained in a given country context. This 
can be religious or social artefacts that the MNE need to be aware of and which might not be 
obvious given the entry mode or is linked to cultural differences between home and host country.  
 
These characteristics are a result of the lack or shortcoming of institutions that should, at least 
formally, be caretakers of these public good facilities. However, in this weak institutional 
environment there is little or nothing that coerce the MNE to behave in ways that will ensure that it 
is regarded as legitimate if it is not actively seeking to engage with the local community and acquire 
this knowledge (Peng and Lou, 2000; Burki, 2012). This has prompted some MNEs to engage in 
stakeholder engagement or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs that could enable the 
knowledge transfer and thereby empower decision makers to engage in legitimacy building or 
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preserving activities (Schwartz and Carrol, 2003). The MNE can achieve thus aim by either a top 
down strategy driven by the HQ or by embedding the subsidiary in the local context.  
 
The choice between a subsidiary and HQ driven strategy is not straight forward as both approaches 
present real advantages and disadvantages, both in terms of operating in a weak institutional 
environment and community risk mitigation. The subsidiary managers can choose to adapt and 
conform to the weakly enforced local regulative conditions and institutionalised norms, indicating 
an embeddedness strategy as described by Feinberg and Gupta (2009). In these weak institutional 
and high risk contexts could prompt the MNEs to adopt a higher degree of operational integration 
indicating greater subsidiary autonomy. The aim of such a strategy would be to adapt to the local 
risk environment and be agile in relation to uncertainties that might arise. Such a strategy would 
then ensure that the MNE is regarded as more legitimate by local stakeholders, as there were 
coherence between the local institutional environment and actions of the company. The alternative 
is to follow a HQ driven strategy where the MNE conforms to industry and international standards 
for corporate behaviour. Such an approach also targets local stakeholders but at the general level of 
consultation and inclusion, and in coordination with other salient stakeholders in other institutional 
environments where the MNE is active. Following such a strategy could be contradictory to these 
local norms or best practice followed by local businesses. However, it would ensure greater 
legitimacy with international stakeholders in other locations and that the company could be 
regarded as legitimate by a much greater constituency. The commonality between the two choices 
of strategy is that both have the purpose of making legitimacy claims towards salient stakeholders 
and thereby reduce risk. Here the embeddedness strategy prompts the MNE conform to the local 
norm, and thereby follow a normative pull that is identified in the local community. Or alternatively 
the MNE is driven by a mimicking strategy, where the use of international standards is used to 
bridge the legitimacy claims of stakeholders across entities.    
 
2.4 MNE governance in weak institutional environments 
For both of these strategies it is possible for the MNE to make use of an overarching governance 
system in order to manage its relations with local communities. And a significant proportion of the 
comprehensive literature on stakeholder engagement is focused on how the firm reacts and changes 
to outside forces in order to retain legitimacy (Schwartz and Carroll, 2003; De Bakker et. al, 2005; 
Campbell et al, 2012; Pavlovich et al., 2016). Prompting firms to identify and relate to stakeholders 
in a much broader context than customer, supplier and new and existing competitors (Freeman et 
al., 2010; Porter, 2008). At the same time acknowledging that the creation and enforcement of 
effective state regulations, at least to some degree, also rely on firms themselves and not exclusively 
on state governance (Campbell, 2007). And that organisations also need to engage in stakeholder 
relations with environmentalists, unions, consumers, communities and others groups in order to 
monitoring these regulatory processes and create a predictable institutional environment in order to 
gain or remain legitimate (Gao and Zhang, 2006; Adam and Shavit, 2008). Underlining that 
regulation is not exclusively placed within the domain of the state and that stakeholder engagement, 
in an institutional perspective, is regarded as a way for firms to manage legitimacy claims in a 
multifaceted business environment.  
 
A model of the theoretical framework illustrates that it is possible for the MNE, in a weak 
regulatory environment, to be a significant organisational actor that can effectively influence 
formalised local institutional development. A weak institutional environment entails an element of 
uncertainty both in terms of facilities like infrastructure, education and culture but also on how 
companies can build legitimacy with the local communities they affect. The role of the risk decision 
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maker is to identify the optimal strategy that will ensure that salient local stakeholders perceive the 
MNE as legitimate. This work is done by engaging in different forms of institution building through 
the construction of Educational, Infrastructure and Cultural facilities in the local community that 
will support these legitimacy claims. This either happen through an embeddedness strategy with 
strong subsidiary autonomy, where the MNE create facilities which are formed on the basis of the 
pressure from local informal institutional environment or alternatively a HQ driven strategy where 
institutions are constructed on the basis of their internal governance systems and on what 
international normative institutions prescribe as best practice.  
 
 
 
3.0 Method and Analytical framework 
This research was done as a case study (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994) that included all nine of the 
MNEs currently active in the Armenian mining sector (see table 1 for an overview of companies 
and operations). This approach provides a unique and in-depth insight into the sector, as well as 
how these companies operate and the strategies they employ in order to cope with a weak 
institutional environment. The nine MNEs represented companies with HQs in Canada, Cyprus, 
United Kingdom, United States, Russia, Germany and China. They include both large operations 
such as the two biggest copper and molybdenum production sites in the country as well as small 
sites focusing on small scale production. A couple of companies are still in the early stages of 
exploration and are therefore not producing ore and a number have been in production since before 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The sample is therefore representative of the MNEs in 
Armenia and can be used to generalize on how different strategies apply to the institutional 
environment compared to variables such as Home country origin, age of operation, type and stage 
of operation as well as utilization of CSR or stakeholder management systems. The approach was 
structured in the following way and in line with established approaches to investigation of 
organisational institutional legitimacy (Vergne, 2011). Firstly, data from the annual reports, 
stakeholder and governance reporting was collected from each mining MNE. The data was coded 
into themes, where the company reported that they have engaged in public good facility 
development activities in the form of education (kindergartens, schools, etc.), infrastructure (roads, 
gasification, etc.) and culture (culture houses, church renovation, etc.). A third category was 
labelled “other” in order to capture any data, which was not included in the three categories but 
could be related the MNEs effort to influence their institutional environment (see table 2 for an 
overview of findings). Secondly, the statements were cross-referenced with empirical evidence 
from on-site field observation as well as interviews with community members at 13 different 
villages close to MNE mining sites. This was done in order to validate the existence and efficiency 
of the institutions, that was claimed constructed, as well as to investigate to what degree these 
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where regarded as legitimate. Thirdly, it was investigated if the MNE was following a HQ or 
embeddedness strategy. Three variables were investigated in order to capture embeddedness 
through interviews with subsidiary managers and local community members. Secondly, the degree 
to which the subsidiary engaged with the community in developing localised solutions as well as 
how the subsidiary applied its competence to the local community in order to solve problems 
caused by the subsidiary activities. And thirdly, if the facilities that were constructed targeted the 
specific issue that the community had or could be regarded as a generic approach. This enabled the 
differentiation between companies that were catering to international institutional norms, that 
prompted them to invest in community facility development, and the ones that had pursued an 
embeddedness strategy, where the local subsidiary could act relatively independent. In order to 
capture if the MNEs strategy had led to loss or gain of legitimacy in the local community and hence 
influenced community risk, were the evidence compared with testimonials from interviews with 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), heads and mayors of local communities as well as 
articles from local newspapers that described the MNE-community relationship. 	
4.0 Analysis and findings 
4.1 Armenian mining - MNEs operating in a weak institutional environment 
In rural Armenian basic public good institutions like effective local political participation, 
healthcare, access to education or basic infrastructure does not exist, are worn down or very 
rudimental (IFC, 2013; IMF, 2015). There are many reasons why the country is unable to build 
effective local institutions like the dismantling of Soviet Union, which removed or degraded a lot of 
these basic institutions, the relative short history of democratic practices, a turbulent start of the 
nation with a war with Azerbaijan, issues of corruption, etc. (De Waal, 2010). While there have 
been some efforts to strengthen the institutional environment, there persists to be significant 
challenges that need to be addressed, especially in the rural parts of the country where informal 
practices are becoming the rule to uphold basic institutional functions.  
 
Mining operations in Armenia dates back to the middle ages and have only increased as world 
demand for copper, iron, silver and gold have seen new heights. During the soviet period mining 
production was expanded vigorously in an effort to recover the union’s poor economy after World 
War II thereby becoming the largest contributor to the Armenian economy. As of 2011 the mining 
industry had more than 400 operating mines including 27 base metal mines, of these are 7 copper-
molybdenum, 3 copper, 13 gold and gold-polymetalic, 2 polymetalic and 2 iron ore mines 
(Investment guide, 2011). Furthermore it is estimated that there are an additional 115 metal deposits 
that could be worth exploring in the future. Taking into account that a major contribution to the 
Armenian economy can be traced back to mining, there good reason to expect that the sector will 
continue to be important to the country for many years to come. The nine MNEs in the study 
includes all the multinationals that are engaging in mining activities ranging from small exploratory 
operations, at the early stages of development, to large scale production facilities that have been 
developed over several decades. An overview of the case companies can be found in table 1. 
 
MNE HQ Home country 
Subsidiary 
operations 
Location 
Type of 
exploration/Production 
Stage of 
mining 
operation 
Years of 
Production 
CSR 
standard 
used 
Croniment Mining Germany Kajaran Copper/molybdenum Production +25 years None 
GeoProMining Russian Agarak/Zod/Ara
rat 
Copper/molybdenum/G
old 
Production +25 years Resources 
for Good 
Vallex Group Cyprus Teghut Copper/molybdenum Production +1 year IFC 
Lydian International Canada Amulsar Gold Exploration 0 years IFC 
Dundee Precious Canada Shahumian/Kap Gold/Silver/Copper/ Production +25 years GRI 
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Metals a Zinc 
Fortune Oil Co China Abovian/ 
Hrazdan/Svaran
ts 
Iron Exploration 0 years None 
Orogon Gold United 
Kingdom 
Mutsk Gold Exploration 0 years None 
Global Gold 
Corporation 
United 
States 
Marjan/	
Toukhmanuk/	
Getik 
Gold Exploration 0 years None 
Cantera Gold Canada Martiros Gold/Silver/Copper/ 
Zinc/Bismuth/Selenium
/Tellurium 
Exploration 0 years EITI 
 
In January 2012 the government of Armenia, in corporation with the World Bank, updated its 
mining legislation, the Mining Code, in order to generate increased revenues from mining activities, 
reduce the cost related to the environmental impact of the industry as well as on the rich cultural 
heritage in the country. The Mining Code was furthermore aimed at improving the governance 
structures and engender transparency to the sector in general, thereby strengthen the institutional 
infrastructure around the industry (Mining code, 2011). While there are disagreements between 
government, industry, research institutes and different NGO groups on the quality of the legislation, 
it meant that the country has witnessed an increase in its tax revenues coming from the sector 
(World Bank, 2014).  
 
Under The Mining Code are companies obliged to adhere to a set of environmental governance 
rules, requiring companies to document their social and environmental impact. They are also 
obliged to have effective systems for mitigation of their negative social and environmental impact 
on the local community, both in the exploration phase and after the mine is in production. Part of 
the Mining Code also includes a contribution to the Environmental Restoration Fund, which is to be 
used for reclaiming land where mining has ceased. The fund is financed by the companies 
themselves and is managed by the government that also has oversight over the restoration process. 
The same is true for cultural heritage sites, which companies are also charged with protecting and 
document their activities and if needed restore any sites that might be affected by production. The 
final objective of the code is to improve the governance structure connecting companies, 
government and civil society (CS) with the aim of facilitating increased transparency. As the World 
Bank consulted the Armenian government, when drafting the legislation, there is a strong 
correlation between the code and the World Bank approach to corporate governance.  
 
The increased self-reporting has brought with it a substantial interest from media and other groups, 
who beforehand had very limited access to company records. This is especially true for MNEs that 
are typical engaged in larger operations and have a greater impact on society than local domestic 
mining firms. The reports typical follow international recognized guidelines like the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) issued by the United Nations, The World Bank International Financial 
Corporation (IFC) standard for social responsibility or in one instance the newly formed EITI 
standard for transparency in extractive industry (GRI, 2013; IFC, 2012; EITI, 2013). One of the 
consequences of this increased transparency is that companies to a larger extend are being held 
accountable to their own reporting and subsequent tests of their claims by NGOs, the media or other 
CS groups interested in the impact of mining operations. However, until now there has not been any 
court decision against a mining company that could be connected to their impact on local 
communities. This and other instances have meant that individuals and NGO groups are becoming 
increasingly hesitant to pursue companies through the court system as trust in the legal system has 
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decreased (CRRC, 2013). In 2008 35% of young people from the age of 18 to 35 said that they 
trusted or fully trusted the legal system a number that in 2013 had gone down to just 19 %. Among 
the group at the age of 56 years and above the same number had gone down from 27% to 11% 
showing a general lack of trust in the legal system by the general population. This makes the 
Armenians the least trusting in their legal governance system of the three southern Caucasus 
countries (Ibid.). The situation is further supported by claims by Transparency International (2015) 
the country ranks in the lower end of the corruption perception index together with indicators on the 
quality of rule of law. 
 
While there are indications that the Armenian government is trying to strengthen its governance 
structures surrounding the country’s dominant mining industry, there continues to be issues when it 
comes to actual enforcement. This means that MNCs, operating in this institutional environment, 
have to observe some basic legislative demands but can to a large extent choose the level of 
ambition regarding environmental and social issues they want to engage in. This represents 
businesses with significant institutional uncertainty where formal institutions, such as court system, 
government agencies and local governance structures easily can be identified but in fact are lacking 
rigid enforcement capability or general legitimacy. The Armenian institutional environment is weak 
mainly due to this lack of enforcement, of existing rules and regulations, coupled with a general 
mistrust in government.  
  
4.2 MNE investments in local institution 
In this weak institutional environment the mining MNEs has increasingly been involved in 
institutional development in the local communities where they are active. These efforts fall within 
three main categories namely education, infrastructure or culture. A summary of the analysis of 
MNE activities in the local communities is listed in Table 2. 
 
4.2.1 Investing in Education  
Involvement in education related investments have been a priority for a number of MNEs engaged 
in local community development. Out of all the nine companies were five who had made 
commitments to either build or renovate educational facilities. This ranged from building 
kindergartens, financial support for education to financing a library and providing scholarships for 
higher education abroad. For example has the Russian MNE GeoProMining, who produce at several 
sites, committed resources to education described by the company as “[The company] pays special 
attention to educational programmes for children and teen-ages. Along with the opening of the 
interactive classes and the scholarship programme for students in universities of Russia and 
Armenia, we support projects aimed at pre-school children. We are involved in the construction of a 
kindergarten in the Ararat region and support this Children Development Centre in Vardenis in its 
educational programmes for children from low-income families living in the region of 
Gegharkunik.” The Canadian company Dundee Precious Metals, also present at several sites, 
reported that “In Kapan, the community infrastructure spending is primarily focused on schools and 
kindergartens, since many require a signiﬁcant amount of structural repair work.” Smaller mining 
operations or mining projects that were in the initial phases of construction was less likely to invest, 
or openly report that they did, in education. One exception was Lydian international a Canadian 
MNE that that invested in a library as well as playground and kindergarten facilities starting already 
in the exploration phases of the project and before production commenced. 
 
The community response to these activities was in general positive, when describing the impact of 
corporate commitment. The main focus was on how the mine would impact the community in the 
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long-term and how education would help community members get employment, especially the 
young. Migration issues were a major concern for most of the communities, where people migrate 
primarily to Russia, in order to get employment. One villager from Teghut said that “the community 
had grown at some extent, because of the project there were vacant workplaces in the village, the 
villagers of Teghut wouldn't leave the country to work in Russia.” The Russian GeoProMining 
commitment in Ararat village showed that long-term commitment is important stating that “The 
smartest youth of Ararat village should have been selected and sent to training and education in 
Russia, finishing their education they would become the future employees of Zod factory, this 
project was successfully launched during first year and then it stopped.” Creating resentment and 
doubt about how committed the MNE was to the village. 
 
4.2.2 Investing in Infrastructure 
The second theme is related to the construction of infrastructure by the MNE. In most of the places, 
where there are mining projects, the infrastructure (e.g. roads, gas, electricity, telephone, etc.) is 
absent or poorly maintained. As the Armenian government cannot provide infrastructure funding 
for these often very small and remote communities, the investments from MNEs are often 
welcomed. For the companies the infrastructure is needed because it is linked to the efficient 
production, at the mine, and for transport of heavy equipment to and from the mining site. This has 
resulted in local communities getting access to gas, paved and maintained roads as well as to a 
constant supply of electricity. For example when a village head from Saravan stated that “Due to 
the joint efforts of Saravan village municipality and Geoteam CJSC [Lydian international 
subsidiary], the gas had been supplied to the village through newly built 8 km gas pipeline”, which 
connected Gndevaz and Saravan villages, and according to the village head in Teghut “roads had 
been renovated, the quality of electricity and telecommunication improved, due to financial support 
of Vallex Group.” all evidence of MNE commitment to the construction of these types of facilities. 
 
It is difficult to differentiate between the operational requirements of the MNE and to what extend 
the infrastructure commitment were a result of a deliberate attempt to do public good. However, 
evidence suggests that it was a combination of both as building a gas pipeline, providing electricity 
etc. for the villages in the area, could be done at a significant reduced price compared to doing the 
same projects independently. The engagement in infrastructure is also the most described parts in 
the governance reporting, when for example GeoProMining states it’s “Involvement in the 
development of socio-economic infrastructure in the regions, where the company operates.”, as well 
describing the details of the commitment as “co-financing the construction of a gas pipeline in the 
village of Sotk in Gegharkunik region of Armenia”. For Crominent the level of commitment was 
very much up to the local subsidiary having an arms-length approach to its operation in Armenia. 
However, none of the two had implemented any formal governance system to handle stakeholder 
relations opting for independent projects or different forms of philanthropy and sponsorships, 
targeting the immediate needs of the community as they are described by the municipality. This 
also meant that the local community were heavily reliant on its relationship with subsidiary 
managers and the MNEs willingness to engage with the mayor for its future development.  
 
For the community the infrastructure projects have been welcomed and have made improvements to 
community life. However, it has also meant that community members increasingly are becoming 
reliant on the goodwill of the MNE, rather than the services that can be provided by the state. Some 
communities have already felt what it entails when company commitment decreases and there is 
less willingness to engage with community members. For example, when interviewing the mayor of 
a local village near a GeoProMining site “when villagers asked about the promised bus, the 
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company replied that they have already renovated the ceiling of Ararat village’s kindergarten and 
didn’t have sufficient financial resources to purchase the bus.” The excuse being that commodity 
prices were down and the company could no longer keep its commitment to the village. The 
reliance on the company to provide these types of public good services create significant resentment 
in the communities, both towards the company but also against the Armenian government, who was 
blamed for not providing these public good service to the community.      
 
4.2.3 Investing in local Culture 
The country has one of the oldest histories in the world dating back to the very beginning of 
civilisation some 5000 years BC and later-on the very origins of Christianity (De Waal, 2010). This 
means that the country is littered with cultural heritage sites of which many are unexcavated. The 
Mining Code (2012) prompts companies to engage in cultural heritage protection on the mining site 
as well as in area affected by mining operation. And all companies that are reporting on cultural 
heritage are engaged in preservation projects in one way or another. Most of the MNEs publically 
acknowledge this responsibility as for example Dundee Precious Metals “We also engaged an 
independent archaeology expert to work with our Kapan employees and local archaeologists to 
ensure that both Armenian law and best practices are consistently being applied”. However, a large 
proportion of cultural heritage sites are situated outside the mining areas. As the Armenian 
government, in many instances, has been unable to fund proper archaeological exploration, are 
many of the sites left untouched or when discovered by chance, reburied. This has left several 
potential discoveries undocumented and unknown to the rest of the world, created a situation where 
private actors, like mining MNE, are regarded as a source of funding for preserving and to some 
extent communicating the Armenian history.  
 
Armenia has a rich and properly the oldest Christian history in the world. And hundreds if not 
thousands churches are scattered all over the land of which many are in need of restoration. Some 
MNEs take on this extended responsibility and engage in project that aim at preserving old churches 
that can have a significant cultural meaning to the local population. But also new churches are being 
built. In Aleverdi, where Vallex is doing copper smelting, a new church was anointed with the 
support of the company and with the participation of high ranking officials and clergy of the 
Armenian Orthodox Church. It also gave an opportunity to place the church project in a wider 
cultural setting as communicated by the corporate president “[The] new church became a new 
spiritual-cultural axis for Alaverdi: rallying round it became easier for Alaverdi people to overcome 
internal contradictions and separations and united they could undertake new projects and new 
achievements in the fields of spiritual and material culture.” This also indicates that the church 
could be seen as a way for the community and the company to come together, despite past and 
present differences. 
 
Sports facilities have been a focus point for some of the MNEs who have seen the opportunity to 
communicate about their company in other cultural settings. The types of activities that the MNEs 
have engaged in has typical been related to popular sports, like chess, or sponsorship of smaller 
local events. As most villages are quite small, only consisting of up to 350 members, there are only 
a few local communities that can benefit from large sports facilities. This means that the typical 
sports facilities project is in the form of renovation of sports halls, connected to the local school or 
one off sport events. However, most of the MNE do not engage directly in sponsorships but rely on 
project funding that the local community can apply for and decide what kind of facilities should be 
improved and in some cases these are facilities for sports.   
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4.2.4 Other types of institutional development 
Some activities fall outside the three main themes that were identified, either because they lack 
institutional rigour, in the form of a physical and tangible presence, or because they fall outside 
typical stakeholder governance structures. Some examples of activities that have institutional 
impact was when MNEs like Crominent created a charity that supported different projects that 
communities can apply for. As stated by the company “The Foundation is organized as a non-profit 
corporation exclusively for public welfare, community involvement and charitable purposes.”, 
which reemphasis the institutional commitment the MNE has to the community but also its 
willingness to be involved in public good institutional development. Or when GeoProMining was 
“Co-sponsor of the International Sports Forum ‘Russia – a Land of Sports’ and the 5th annual 
international 2012 Children of Asia Games.” thereby creating a link between subsidiary activities 
and HQ home country. These types of large-scale project are however rare and the general focus 
seem to be on a much smaller scale and to a larger extent is embedded in the community and its 
daily needs. 
 
4.3 MNE Strategy and Community risk 
The strategic decision to engage in the construction of facilities and thereby strengthen public good 
institutional development can stem from two sources, the local subsidiary level or alternatively as 
part of the HQ commitment. The result that these strategies produce are translated into different 
community risk consequences depending on the legitimacy that the MNE either gains or losses. 
 
Of the nine MNEs included in the survey there were three perusing a subsidiary focus strategy, 
where the local branch had relative autonomy to peruse a strategy independently of the HQ. The 
three Crominent, Vallex and Lydian have all focused on creating a diverse set of localised solutions 
with all three themes Education, Infrastructure and Culture. While both Vallex and Lydian used the 
IFC standard to govern the HQ/subsidiary relationship had Crominent no such standardized 
approach in place. Of the two first MNEs, one had only been in production for one year while the 
other was still in the exploration phase of the project. The last MNE had been producing ore for 
over 25 years and the site had switched hand several times before ending in the hands of the 
German owned Crominent. All three had the commonality that they were focusing their efforts on 
one specific site and could hence concentrate on a limited number of communities. The effect of 
this was also evident when talking to village heads and mayors. They claim that the contact with the 
subsidiary was more frequent and many of the initiatives that were implemented had originally 
come from the communities themselves. Such as the need for water, gasification, road maintenance 
but also in relation to cultural church renovation and the establishment of culture houses. This 
commitment also brought significant media publicity and attracted the attention of NGOs for 
example when talking to CEO of Lydian they stated that “The NGOs here are extremely aggressive 
they are more activist then anything else. The greatest example is that the day before yesterday we 
had a meeting organised by NGOs and one of them stood up and said that if I know that Lydian 
International was here I would not have come.” While the MNE have made significant investments 
in the local communities, it was a difficult for them to get in dialogue with civil society “They do 
not want to engage. They have a very primitive view that activists can stop mining, which in my 
view is a total dream. They do not understand that the best way to improve mining is to engage with 
mining companies.” When asking the same questions to the NGOs they claim that the investments 
and efforts are a front for “stealing” the resources of the country and though their investments 
seducing the local population so that they will not know what the real (Social, Economical and 
Cultural) impact would be, until they were powerless to do something about it. The NGOs had 
much the same perspective on the MNE just reverse, especially relating to the process of 
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negotiations with the local community and the environmental impact of mining, specifically the 
consequences related to waste tailing dams and the possible long-term effects. As for example when 
talking about the site where Crominent is producing copper “What will happen if Kajaran close? 
Imaging if that would happen. Remember Artavik? Is the villages where the tailing dam is located 
they have since the 70ties literately have been complaining to the soviet and after that the Armenian 
government about the pollution and have talked about resettlement. The village does not exist 
anymore now.” These two examples illustrate one of many description of relationship between 
mining MNEs and NGOs. However, municipality and local government officials were becoming 
increasingly reliant on the MNEs to provide them with a legitimacy base, because of the 
investments that the company brought to the communities. The reason being that the relationship 
provided them with a position where they could negotiate on behalf of the village and thereby 
ensure resources invested in popular or much needed institutions like the local church, sports 
facilities or infrastructure, that would improve the daily lives of community members. The pattern 
here was that the older the mine site the deeper the ties between community and MNE, making it 
difficult for NGOs to actively engage with communities. An indication that the relationship was 
strong was also evident as communities that were heavily affected by the negative consequences of 
mining did not want the close despite evidence to support such action. As one stated “I am sure that 
there was no company in the world, which would be able to fully eliminate risks, e.g. the car engine 
didn’t make any voice only in standing position.” Despite having earlier stated that the town had 
considerable more cases of lung deceases, cancer and children born with mental and physical 
handicaps.    
 
For the HQ driven MNEs it was found that all had issues in relation being perceived as legitimate 
by the local communities, despite some of them having quite comprehensive CSR and stakeholder 
engagement programs. Few of the companies had invested in localised solutions and if so, it was 
mainly engagement that was benefitting the MNE such as infrastructure investments. Four of the six 
MNEs did not engage in any known type of public good activities and primarily communicated 
though their website to potential investors and mainly on geological data on ore yield. Two had 
implemented CSR systems (EITI and a self-develop system called “Resources for Good”) that were 
used for managing their stakeholder engagement initiatives. Most of the companies had not made 
any direct investment in the local communities and had primarily engaged in different forms of 
sponsorships or scholarships that were more widely available to different stakeholder groups. All 
MNEs had experienced a legitimacy loss with the local community. However, Dundee Precious 
Metals had been able to gain some legitimacy because of a church renovation project as well as 
funding small local enterprises but these initiatives had only been implemented at a later stage and 
possible due to outside pressure. The most active of the HQ driven MNEs, when it comes to 
investments in stakeholder activities, was GeoProMining. However, they had experienced a loss of 
legitimacy mainly due to its failure to live up to the expectations of the community, for example, 
when the company was accused of failing to continue its scholarship program for young promising 
engineers and not providing a promised bus service. This has created room for village heads as well 
as NGOs and newspapers to criticise the company, which has further escalated the loss of 
legitimacy. 
 
Multinational 
Enterprise 
(MNE) 
Local Institutions created or upgraded Other Activities HQ Driven or 
Subsidiary Driven 
strategy 
Strategy led to gain 
or loss of legitimacy Educational 
facilities 
Infrastructure Cultural 
facilities 
Crominent 
Mining 
Support of 
existing 
educational 
facilities local 
Subsidising 
local 
municipality 
Healthcare 
Sport 
facilities 
 
Charity established  Subsidiary  Legitimacy gain 
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and regionally  facilities 
GeoProMining Scholarship 
(Education in 
Russia) 
Kindergarten 
Water 
Gas pipeline 
Fire safety 
 
Sponsorships 
(Focus on 
events, 
education and 
sports) 
 
 HQ Legitimacy loss 
Vallex Group Kindergarten 
 
Roads 
Repair of 
houses 
Culture house 
Church  
 
Scholarships 
Formal local 
grievance system  
Subsidiary Legitimacy gain 
Lydian 
International 
Playground 
Community 
library 
 
Water 
distribution 
pipeline 
Garbage 
collection 
Roads 
Irrigation 
system 
Gas pipeline  
 
 
Local 
administratio
n building 
Culture house 
Sports 
facilities/ 
Competition 
  
 
Local hospital 
equipment upgrade  
Fixed local TV 
channels  
Donations and 
Scholarships 
Tree nursery project, 
which will create an 
additional 8-10 jobs  
Ambulance vehicle 
for hospital. 
Formal local 
grievance system 
Subsidiary Legitimacy gain 
Dundee 
Precious 
Metals 
School 
Kindergarten 
None Church 
renovation 
Sports events 
Scholarships 
SME funding 
HQ Legitimacy gain 
(Loss of legitimacy 
in early stages of 
development) 
Fortune Oil Co None None None  HQ Legitimacy loss 
Orogon Gold None None None  HQ No impact 
Global Gold 
Corporation 
None None None  HQ Legitimacy loss 
Centerra Gold None None None  HQ No impact 
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated how a weak of institutional pressure has influenced corporate decisions to 
be involved in creating public good institutions and to what extent these activities have been 
instrumental in reducing community risk, as a loss of legitimacy. Two strategies were investigated 
one where the MNE used an embeddedness strategy, where the MNE subsidiary made efforts to 
respond to local institutional pressure and another strategy that focused on a HQ driven approach. It 
was found that MNEs were engaged in institutional development that could be considered under the 
domain of public good institutions. Firstly, MNE engaged in these kinds of activities in order to 
remedy the lack of infrastructure that was needed to conduct mining operations such as access to 
adequate roads, electricity and gas. The typically MNE extended the infrastructure development to 
include nearby villages as the costs associated with doing this was minimal compared with having 
to do the same activity at a later stage when labour and machinery could be unavailable. Secondly, 
support or development of educational institutions serve much of the same purpose but could be 
considered to be a two tracked strategy. One focused on competence building that would serve as a 
future recruitment base for the MNE, like for example investing in university scholarships. The 
second type of investments was focused on pre- or primary school institutions, which could not be 
directly translated into competency building at least not into the foreseeable future. Thirdly, and 
properly the activities which were most distant from the business of mining, were the involvement 
with cultural institutions. These activities were more philanthropic in nature and involved 
traditional sponsorships of sports or other forms of cultural activities but also larger projects like 
conservation or even construction of churches and culture houses. These types of activities were 
more distant from the capabilities of the MNE and did not serve any direct purpose in terms of 
business continuity.  
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By prescribing to either an Embeddedness or HQ driven strategy the MNEs could gain or lose 
legitimacy with the local communities they were affecting. Companies that gained legitimacy were 
all pursuing an embeddedness strategy and investments were made in close corporation with the 
local community. This approach helped the MNE to gain legitimacy as local dependence on the 
intuitions grew stronger and community members became increasingly reliant on the benefits that 
came with these continuous investments. The alternative HQ driven strategy showed that most 
companies did not invest and the ones that did, focused on more general types of activities such as 
sponsorships or scholarships that were targeting a much wider stakeholder audience. The company 
that did focus on the community, after a fall in legitimacy, seemed to recover their loss showing the 
focus on local institution building reduced community risk. It was found that engagement in 
institution building, not only had a direct operational requirement, as in the case of infrastructure 
and educational, but also served a purpose as part of a risk mitigation strategy towards NGOs and 
the media. By gaining legitimacy and dependence from local communities the MNE can reduce the 
risks that the community would engage with these outside and possible powerful stakeholders. 
Institution building hence serves a dual purpose, firstly, making communities reliant on the MNE 
by providing public good facilities in the absence of a fully functioning state, as we know it from 
the developed world. And secondly, as an effective risk mitigation tool that keeps possible 
threatening NGOs and other CS actors from partnering with local communities against the company 
thereby presenting a risk to its continued operations. 
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